In Science, Truth and Democracy, Kitcher moderates the strongest ontological realist thesis he defended in The Advancement of Science, with the aim of making compatible the correspondence theory of truth with conceptual relativity. However, it is not clear that both things could be harmonized. If our knowledge of the world is mediated by our categories and concepts; if the selection of these categories and concepts may vary according to our interests, and they are not the consequence of the existence of certain supposed natural kinds or some intrinsic structure of the world, it is very problematic to establish what our true statements correspond to. This paper analyzes the transformation in Kitcher's realism and expounds the main difficulties in this project.
and are related to democratic ideals, are of central importance in Kitcher's work.
My objectives in this paper are to analyze the main theses of the realism that Kitcher defends in The Advancement of Science (abbreviated as AS), and to evaluate the transformation this realism undergoes in his later book Science, Truth, and Democracy (abbreviated as STD). I will argue that, although these transformations are important, they are nevertheless those that can be strictly outlined when some aspects of science as social activity are faced from the position of a moderate realism. Finally, I will expose some internal ontological troubles that arise within Kitcher's realist proposal and offer a possible solution.
Kitcher's Realism in The Advancement of Science
Let us start by explaining what Kitcher means by realism. In AS (p. 127) he sums up his realist view of science with the following words: "scientists find out things about a world that is independent of human cognition; they advance true statements, use concepts that conform to natural divisions, develop schemata that capture objective dependencies." Two basic components 1. In the most prominent areas of science, the research is progressive, and this progressive character is manifested in increased powers of prediction and intervention.
2. Those increased powers of prediction and intervention give us the right to claim that the kinds of entities described in scientific research exist independently of our theorizing about them and that many of our descriptions are approximately correct.
3. Nonetheless, our claims are vulnerable to future refutation. We have the right to claim that our representations of nature are roughly correct while acknowledging that we may have to revise them tomorrow.
4. Typically our views in the most prominent areas of science rest upon evidence, and disputes are settled by appeal to cannons of reason and evidence.
5. Those canons of reason and evidence also progress with time as we discover not only more about the world but also more about how to learn about the world. 1 In "Knowledge, Society, and History," Kitcher writes: "We mark the difference between those propositional states that accurately represent reality from those that do not by dividing the pertinent propositions into those that are true from those that are false. The notion of truth as correspondence is this not some peculiar metaphysical extravagance but part of an important way of thinking about ourselves and others," (Kitcher 1993b, p. 166) . Nevertheless, he concedes to Kuhn that the notion of truth cannot be applied to whole theories, (cf. Kitcher 1993a, p. 129).
As can easily be noted, this brand of realism has a clear Popperian flavor and it is even stronger than that proposed by some of Popper's heirs. It is not a naïve realism, but a critical and fallibilist one (thesis 3). It is also plainly rationalist (thesis 4), although, unlike Popper's realism, it is open to the possibility that canons of rationality may change historically (thesis 5).
Despite the fact that Kitcher considers these five theses to be uncontroversial, he acknowledges in a footnote that the sense of thesis 2 has been legitimately disputed by some philosophers, such as Hilary Putnam, Arthur Fine, Nelson Goodman and Richard Rorty. He thinks that for these authors the problem with thesis 2 is not that it cannot have some acceptable sense, but that traditionally it has been loaded with questionable metaphysical additions. As for the authors, such as the antirealists from the field of Science Studies, whose rejection of the realist theses is more global, they have to take on the burden of proof. They have to show, with sound arguments, why the former theses are to be discarded. Indeed, Kitcher sees realism as the natural attitude that human beings develop spontaneously in their cognitive dealings with the world. If the antirealist attitude proliferates in philosophy, it is because it is erroneously believed that there are arguments against realism that cannot be satisfactorily answered.
2 Seemingly, with this elucidation, Kitcher wishes to separate semantic antirealism (as that proposed by pragmatists and
Putnam's internal realism) from the radical antirealism coming from constructivist and relativist positions. If the former may be useful in order to discard some exaggerated claims of the realist position, the latter simply has no sufficient argumentative ground. Not surprisingly, Kitcher ends up by accepting in STD some ideas of the first type of antirealism.
Thesis 1 and thesis 2 jointly constitute the basis of a central argument adduced by realists and, consequently, one of the main targets of antirealist criticism. It is the sort of argument known as 'inference to the best explanation', in this case applied to realism as an explanation of scientific success. The argument is as follows: the enormous predictive, explanatory, practical… success of science is a surprising fact that requires an explanation; the best explanation of such success is to suppose that the entities referred by scientific theories do exist and that these theories formulate (approximately) true claims about them (as realism holds); therefore, realism should be accepted.
Sometimes the argument is strengthened, as Putnam managed at the initial realist phase of his intellectual trajectory, with the claim that otherwise, scientific success would be 'a miracle' (cf. Putnam 1978, p. 19) . That would imply that realism is not only the best explanation of scientific success, but actually the only sensible one.
are more reasons to draw an optimistic conclusion. There have been an increasing number of cases of approximate truth and preserved reference in theoretical terms (from the point of view of current science), at least if we consider recent historical periods. However, since no one counted the number of referring and non-referring theoretical terms in the historical record, it is nothing more than an impression. On the other hand, even it were true that the amount of theoretical terms that keep their reference surpass the amount of non-referring terms, that would still leave unexplained the success of the theories mentioned by Laudan, and it would not explain why the persistence of the currently postulated theoretical entities makes its existence more credible than the existence of the entities postulated in the past, some of which have survived for a long time.
This is the reason that impels Kitcher to look for a more forceful counter-argument.
He considers, then, a more plausible way to get an optimistic conclusion from the historical record. Throughout the history of science, successive theories (or explanatory schemata, statements, etc.) appear closer to the truth than previous ones from the perspective of some other 3 Michael Levin's criticism consists of arguing that truth has no explanatory capacity. Kitcher responds in his (2002a). Van Fraassen's criticism aims to show the fallacious character of the realist argument. The point is that, either the argument presupposes what is to be proved -that the hypothesis that best explains a fact is true for that very reason-, and therefore it is a circular argument, or it excludes, without justification, the possibility that all explanations of scientific success we have at the moment are unsuitable and, consequently, the realist explanation would just be the best one in a bad lot of explanations, without merits enough to be accepted. As far as I know, Kitcher has not answered this criticism, even though he has argued against constructive empiricism in general.
later theory. That authorizes us to suspect that our current theories will appear also in the future closer to the truth than do past theories. However, this proposal still seems too weak to Kitcher, for it assumes a generalized fallibilism for which the history of science gives no motive. We are not equally subject to error about everything. About some things we have obtained a firmer knowledge than about others. For that reason, "instead of a blanket pronouncement to the effect that our current theories are probably wrong, it would be far more instructive to investigate the stability of various components of practice in various fields." (Kitcher 1993a, p. 138) . It should be unveiled by reviewing the history of science and also with the aid of the cognitive sciences "where we are most likely to make mistakes and where we are legitimately confident." (Kitcher 1993a, p. 138, note 16 ).
Accordingly, in order to be convincing and undermine realist optimism Laudan's argument would have to show not only that in the past there were non-referring and still successful theories, but also that among the parts of these theories responsible for their success there were some considered false from a realist perspective, i. e., some non-referring parts. The reason is clear: "it is not enough to conceive a theory as a set of statements and distribute the success of the whole uniformly over the parts. One has to see how the statements are used." (Kitcher 1993a, p. 143 ).
Laudan's pessimistic induction fails, then, until it can be shown that the phlogiston, the crystalline spheres, the ether, and the other non-extant theoretical entities were essential elements in the success of the theories to which they belonged. The facts seem to indicate, however, that things
were not like this. The postulation of ether, for example, was no more than a heuristic resource without any function in the predictive success of Maxwell's electromagnetic theory. 4 In this respect, Kitcher distinguishes within the scientific practice between the "working posits" and the "presuppositional posits." The former are the referents of theoretical terms that occur in problemsolving schemata; the latter are the entities that apparently have to exist if the solutions to the problems provided by the theory are true. Laudan would have shown, at best, that presuppositional posits are suspect, but he would not have proved anything about the working posits.
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Kitcher also enlarges in AS on the answers to other well-known realist arguments: the theory ladenness of observation and the underdetermination of theories by evidence.
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The thesis of the theory ladenness of observation is not properly an antirealist thesis.
However, antirealists make frequent use of it, since, in a radical interpretation, may lead to antirealism. In effect, if all observation is theory-laden, and one assumes that observation is the basic touchstone to choose among theories, then the choice always will be made from the assumptions of a theory. That is interpreted by the antirealist as a recognition of the impossibility of an objective choice among theories, and, in extreme cases, as an acknowledgement that the notion of objective reality is completely non-functional and, therefore, senseless. In this extreme interpretation, what we call 'objective reality' is something constructed by our conceptual schemes or by our social practices. Kitcher points out two possible strategies in order to respond to this use of the theory-ladenness thesis. The first one is Fodor's strategy, which shows that "the plasticity of observation has been greatly overrated" (Kitcher 1993a, p. 225 (Kitcher 1993a, p. 233) . In other words, even though it is accepted that observation is theory-laden, there are several ways of improving it (e. g. by making it more accurate, more detailed, less prone to error, etc.), and everybody can recognize these ways of improved observation as the best in a context. Therefore, the theory-ladenness of observation does not prevent us from considering some observations as better than others. The conflict between incompatible observational reports need not be unsolvable in a rational and objective way. The error of many antirealists, like Kuhn, is that they jump from the very reasonable thesis (although disputed by Fodor and some others) that our perception of nature is dependent on our theories, to the less justifiable claim that nature itself is reference potential can explain how the reference is partially preserved through the changes of theories. Therefore, it neutralizes the objection raised by incommensurability to realism, according to which it is impossible to see the changes of theories as a progress towards a truer conception of reality if the reference is not maintained in these changes. The idea behind the notion of reference potential is that terms do not refer in a homogeneous way. There are several heterogeneous possibilities in which scientific community may fix their reference in each concrete case. Although, as Kuhn held, after a change of theory the reference potential has changed, it is always feasible to recognize the reference of some tokens of a term, and offer a translation of these tokens into the language of the new theory. We cannot find, for example, something equivalent to 'phlogiston' in the post-Lavoisier chemistry, but we can say that in some cases 'dephlogisticated air' was employed by Pristley referring to oxygen (cf. Kitcher 1993a, pp. 78 and 97-105; 1982b, pp. 337-359 As for the underdetermination argument, Kitcher thinks that it may be of some logical interest, but it has little to do with the actual scientific practice, wherein one hardly finds two completely equivalent theories in their observational consequences but different in their nonobservational postulates. If the prior scientific practice is taken into account, the serious empirically equivalent rivals of a given theory with respect to the same evidence are few in number. Furthermore, the contribution of new evidences may eventually dissolve this rivalry.
8
Kitcher also follows other critics of underdetermination, like Laudan, when he adduces that the consistency of a theory with the empirical evidence is one thing, and quite another is the support this evidence gives to such a theory. There may be two theories equally consistent with a set of evidences and, nonetheless, one of them may be better supported by these evidences than the other. Finally, in Kitcher's view, the epistemological costs of maintaining a rival hypotheses and dropping the other could be, in a certain moment, too great -and even inadmissible-. As it would have happened if, for example, some version of geocentrism empirically equivalent to 7 As we said in a previous note, in "A Plea for Science Studies", he returns to the issue and he strengthens his arguments, although this time he exonerates Kuhn from any responsibility: "As Thomas Kuhn […] clearly saw, the fact that concepts and categories are involved in observation doesn't mean that the content of experience is determined by them or that we cannot be led by experience to reconceptualize the phenomena. Nor does it imply that we are somehow 'cut off' from the world or that the only world we can talk about must be 'constructed'. […] In perception, we are in causal contact with physical objects, and although this contact is mediated by our having certain kinds of psychological states ('perceptions', 'representations'), we do not perceive by perceiving those states.
[…] So it would be more accurate to say not that the world is shaped by our categories but that our representations of the world are so shaped and that the shaping is open to empirical investigation." (Kitcher 1998, pp. 38-39 Sometimes such theories might be two linguistic formulations of the same theory (as in the case of Schrödinger's wave mechanics and Heisenberg's matrix mechanics), on other occasions it might not be possible to make a scientifically based decision. In this work (p. 36), he concedes more importance to the problem. He does not see it anymore as a problem of scarce interest out of the philosophical realm, but he stresses its existence in scientific practice. Nonetheless, he remarks that it has less extent than it is supposed. It is not difficult to point out some cases in which it is not conceivable a serious and empirically equivalent alternative to an accepted theory. "What's -he asks-the supposed rival to the hypothesis that the typical structure of DNA is a double helix with sugar-phosphate backbones and bases jutting inwards?" He adds (p. 32) also a new argument to show that, in case of real situations of complete and permanent empirical equivalence, the proponents of underdetermination could not maintain their theses. According to several proponents of underdetermination, particularly some sociologists of science, granted that scientific theories are always underdetermined by empirical evidence, the decision between a theory and its empirically equivalent rival will be always grounded on social and political preferences. Now then, to be coherent, the proponents of underdetermination should also accept that the thesis that a theory supports certain social and political values better than its rival is also empirically underdetermined. Therefore, the appeal of these non-epistemic values would not endow the choice with rationality.
169-173).
In spite of that, Kitcher tones down in some ways the forcefulness of this realism. He notes, for example, that changes in scientists' individual and collective practices -particularly changes in the identification of significant problems, and in the acceptance of explanatory schemes and statements-do not depend only on dictates of empirical evidence (on "encounters with nature," in Kitcher's terms), but also depend (although not in a exclusive way, as some sociologists assume) on the "conversations with peers." Social factors have a role in the scientist's decisions, but they are not determinant factors. Kitcher proposes an intermediate stance between extreme internalism and extreme externalism:
The position that the sociologists attack is the extreme suggestion that social determinants make no difference:
given the same inputs from asocial nature there will be the same modifications of consensus practice, no matter what the social structure. They counterpose the extreme view that inputs from nature are impotent, or at least impotent with respect to the framework of consensus practice: given the same social structure, there will be the same modifications of consensus practice, no matter what the inputs from asocial nature, and, in particular, the 9 In "A Plea for Science Studies," he sums up in a few words his position about the underdetermination problem: "Duhem started a line of thought that enables us to see that there is no instant rationality in science, but it's wrong to conclude from this that there are not context-independent standards of good reasoning that, when applied to increasingly comprehensive experiences, resolve scientific debates. 2. No scientist ever comes to the laboratory or the field without categories and preconceptions that have been shaped by the prior history of the group to which he or she belongs.
3. The social structures present within science affect the ways in which research is transmitted and received, and this can have an impact on intratheoretical debates.
4. The social structures in which science is embedded affect the kind of questions that are taken to be most significant and, sometimes, the answers that are proposed and accepted.
Obviously, the most distant point from the realist position defended in AS is the end of thesis 4. In fact, the rest is recognized, one way or another, in AS. 12 A scientific realist has no difficulty in accepting that social structures affect the setting of a research agenda, that is to say, "the kind of questions that are taken to be most significant"; but it is a horse of a different color for the realist to concede that social structures affect "the answers that are proposed and accepted," especially if
it means that what answers are justified or valid will depend on the social structures. For a realist, social factors and non-epistemic values may affect the context of discovery and the context of 12 Even though in The Advancement of Science (p. 6) Kitcher described his central aim as "to probe the notions of progress and rationality, dear to Legend's champions" (balancing them with the contributions of some critics), later he seemingly prefers to describe it as an attempt to understand the form in which the social aspects operate: "[I]n The Advancement of Science, I try to show the intricacy of the reasoning processes that figure in major scientific debates and to construct a formal framework for understanding how various kinds of social institutions, social relationships, and personal aspirations can play a positive role in the genesis of new knowledge," (Kitcher 1998, p. 45).
application, but they cannot affect the context of justification without undermining scientific objectivity (cf. Koertge 2000).
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However, Kitcher does not seem to be prepared to give to the external influences an important role in the context of justification. He writes: "the practical demands and the history of research standards also help determine what will count as acceptable solutions, specifying, for example, the precision that an answer must achieve if it is to be applicable." (Kitcher 1998, p. 37).
Social factors play, then, a very limited role in the acceptation of proposals by the scientific community: they can modify the rigor of acceptance criteria, so that a hypothesis which passes these criteria in a historical context will not pass them in another context, yet they cannot themselves dictate these criteria. As already pointed out, Kitcher made clear in AS that social factors do not determine the closure of scientific debates. On the contrary, debates are "ultimately closed through the articulation and acceptance of decisive arguments." Arguments should be, then, "the principal source of power," so that "in a competition between the social factors and arguments leading in a contrary direction, the acquisition of power should be more affected by the arguments. (Social factors may retard a decision, but never reverse it)." (Kitcher 1993a, pp. 201-202 ). 14 Nothing said in STD denies these claims.
But let us begin at the beginning. Of course, Kitcher's modest realism, as it is displayed in STD, agrees with the realism offered in AS on the postulation of a mind-independent reality which can suitably be known by human beings, as well as on the acceptation of the correspondence theory of truth. Kitcher coherently refuses the Kantian-constructivist thesis that the world is something we construct by means of our conceptual or linguistic frameworks. What we construct are our representations, not the world. We have direct access to a mind-independent reality able to be known; although Kitcher admits -without making clear the apparent conflict which arisesthat the constructivist may be right when he claims this access is always mediated by our concepts.
For that very reason, modest realism must deny the distinction between phenomenon and noumenon. It is not that we know the noumenon through the phenomenon, or that we know the 13 A realist may admit that social factors affect not only the research agenda but also "the contents of the beliefs of scientists," (Niiniluoto 1999, p. 268, note) ; but then it is a question of the content of the beliefs of individual scientists. A realist could also admit that the considered hypotheses are constrained by non-epistemic values that foster biases for or against some hypotheses. What cannot be carried out by such factors, according to the realists, is to determine what contents the scientific community accepts or considers justified. 14 For a criticism, see Shanahan (1997) and Solomon (1995) . For the reasons mentioned, Solomon accuses Kitcher of being closer to "Legend" than he would like to admit. In her view, "scientists tend to be persuaded about a theory not when they have made a balanced consideration of all its merits and demerits, and judged it superior to all alternatives, but for more 'sullied' reasons such as the theory's superior performance in their own area of research, their own collection of supportive data, peer pressure, bandwagon effects, graduate school training, etc." (Solomon 1995, p. 215) . So, any philosopher who denies this wants to preserve the "Legend". Anyway, Solomon interprets correctly Kitcher's position when she sees that Kitcher's open attitude to social factors does not go as far as to dilute the "merits and demerits" of theories in "more sullied reason," whatever that may mean. noumenon directly; we just directly know a reality with which we interact and whose properties we are sometimes able to detect successfully (cf. Kitcher 2001a, pp. 14-15, 16 note, and 25-28; 2001b, pp. 183-184) .
However, the modest realism of STD is also in several aspects more sophisticated than the realism introduced in AS. It assumes, for instance, that the world can be conceptualized in very different ways; that the truths about it can be expressed in very diverse languages; and, therefore, that there is no privileged language or conceptual scheme able to give the only correct description of the world. Just like Putnam's conceptual relativity, Kitcher's modest realism holds that "there is thus no determinate answer to the question, 'How many things are there?' and no possibility of envisaging a complete inventory of nature." (Kitcher 2001a, p. 45; cf. 2001b, p. 196) . But, this does not mean that there are no mind-independent entities. There is a mind-independent reality, but it is not a labeled reality. It is not a reality categorized and structured in a fixed form, irrespective of our interests and concepts. 15 Nevertheless, epistemological relativism, so popular among constructivists, is not justified either. Not every classification of the world is as valid as any other. Depending on our interests and aims, there will be more suitable languages and, then, more suitable classifications. None of them -and the relativist is right about that-could ever be considered the most suitable from an absolute point of view, i. e., in all the contexts and for any purpose. But, some classification could be considered the most suitable in some concrete context.
In short, there is not a perfect language that will give us the authentic classification of true natural kinds, because any classification is always relative to some interests and aims; however, for some purposes it can be shown that certain classifications are better than others. This can be illustrated with the way in which present biology contemplates biological species. Sometimes they are distinguished according to morphological criteria (as in the case of plants with asexual reproduction), other times according to their reproductive isolation (as in the case of twin species), and still in other situations according to molecular criteria (as in the case of bacteria and viruses).
The division into species depends, then, on scientists' interests in each situation, but in each context a division is preferable to others (cf. Kitcher 2001a, pp. 45-49).
16 15 Niiniluoto holds the same: "THE WORLD [that is, the mind-independent world] does not contain self-identifying individuals, but can be categorized into objects in several alternative, overlapping ways relative to conceptual schemes. For example, depending on the choice of a suitable conceptual framework, THE WORLD can be 'sliced' or 'structured' to a system of momentary events, mass points, physical systems, etc." (Niiniluoto 1999, p. 222) . 16 It is important to note that Kitcher's pluralism about the species concept is not a conventionalist thesis, but a realist one. Conventionalists think that the diversity of species concepts is a good reason for denying the reality of such a category. What we call 'species' is a very different thing in every case, and its distinction from other taxa is problematic (cf. Stanford 1995; Ereshefsky 1998 The history of map-making -he writes-illustrates the modest realism with which I began. Consider some of the maps of our planet offered by the geographers of the past, maps of the entire globe. Later maps appear superior to earlier ones in two major respects. First, they include entities that were previously omitted, the New World and Australasia being the most striking examples. Second, their depictions of the spatial relations among the entities commonly represented are more accurate; the margins of the various countries follow actual coastlines more closely. We make these judgements without believing that any of the maps ever produced is completely accurate, even while admitting the possibility that earlier maps might occasionally deliver a more accurate representation of some local features, and that the kind of convergence we appreciate visually need not be monotonic. (Kitcher 2001a, p. 55).
Stephen Toulmin was one of the first authors who used the metaphor of scientific theories as maps, and curiously enough he did it to defend a kind of instrumentalism (cf. Toulmin 1953, chap.
4). More recently, it has been used by Ronald Giere to defend a more modest realism than
Kitcher's version (although very similar to it in some aspects) (cf. Giere 1999).
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Maps are always partial, selective, and possess conventional elements. They can offer only a perspective of reality based on our aims when we elaborate them. Depending on such aims, some entities or others will be chosen as objects to be represented, and some reading conventions or others will be accepted. A political map will pick out aspects of reality very unlike those presented in a rainfall map, a road map, an economic map, or a geological map, and it will represent these aspects by means of diverse conventional signs. All these maps might refer to the same region;
however, the representation they offer will be dissimilar. In addition, it is senseless to postulate an exhaustively complete and correct map. Not even the Borgesian map of an empire, which when unfolded, had the same extension of the actual empire, would be complete, since it would need to be selective in some ways. In other words, there is not a single correct way of making a map. But,
as opposed to what Giere maintains, Kitcher thinks that maps can be described as (approximately) true or false. A map of Spain in which Madrid is nearer to Valencia than to Toledo, or in which the Guadalquivir River flows into the Bay of Biscay, would be not only an inaccurate map. It could be said to be a false map. Following the analogy, scientific theories are also partial and tied to conventional elements of representation which might change depending on the interests; nevertheless, even in that case, it would make sense to talk about the true or falsity of its assertions about the world:
Like maps, scientific theories and hypotheses must be true or accurate (or, at least, approximately true or roughly accurate) to be good. But there is more to goodness in both instances. Beyond the necessary condition is a requirement of significance that cannot be understood in terms of some projected ideal -completed science, a Theory of Everything, or an ideal atlas. (Kitcher 2001a, p. 61 ).
This quotation brings up an additional point that has great relevance in STD, although it was present in AS in an incipient way. Science does not aim to achieve the truth without more ado, but to achieve significant truths; just like maps do not represent for the sake of accuracy, but in order to be useful for some practical purposes. In science, however, significance is not a basically practical matter, as in the maps, but an epistemic one. What is important for science is to achieve epistemically significant truths. Now then, all the attempts carried out within the philosophical tradition to find a characterization of significance valid for all times and contexts have failed. The reason is that one cannot separate epistemic significance and the concrete practical concerns that guide the scientific community in given historical situations. The best proposal that can be found in the matter is, in Kitcher's view, the one that identifies epistemic significance with the capacity to offer objective explanations about nature: a significant truth would be a truth able to provide an objective explanation or an objective understanding of phenomena. Actually several aspects of explanations depend on the context, not only because the context says what things are to be explained, but also because it determines which explanations are satisfactory according to the audience. There is nothing like a 'significant-in-all-contexts-explanation'.
The contextual character of significance has important consequences in practice. There are no ideal atlases, ideal classifications of the world, or context-independent objective explanations.
This implies, as we are told in the epilogue of STD, that "Nature is shaped by our past interests, its current configurations partially determine our present needs, and out of these needs grow our further attempts to solve problems we take to be epistemically and practically significant" (p. 199).
The following step in Kitcher's argumentation (to which the second part of the book is dedicated) seems then quite logical: if science looks for significant truths and the significance is not something that some truths possess intrinsically, but depends on the context, then we are
entitled to establish what truths we want science to look for at each moment, i. e., what truths we consider more significant for our interests. The usual answer to this question has, hitherto, been that the scientists themselves have to determine such matter. Kitcher thinks that in democratic world, he refuses the distinction phenomenon/noumenon. But, I am inclined to think that this viewpoint does not solve the difficulty. We could say that true statements correspond to a conceptually structured reality, with this reality being the result of applying our concepts and categories to an independent and unstructured world causally related to us. So, our true statements would be causally selected by the world itself. This causal interaction, however, would not be enough to establish a correspondence between our statements and an unstructured "something,"
among other reasons, because that correspondence is not a causal relation (we can talk about a correspondence between a sentence and some future fact, which obviously is not causally related to us).
Niiniluoto discusses in some detail this question that also arises in his proposal of a critical scientific realism (cf. Niiniluoto 1999, pp. 224-226) . 21 In order to solve it, he distinguishes between unidentified facts and identified facts. Unidentified facts are the facts contained in the mind-independent world, whereas identified facts are the facts belonging to a structured worldversion. According to Niiniluoto, if a sentence is true in a world-version -if it is true about some identified facts-, then it is true in the mind-independent world as well -it is true about some unidentified facts. The reason is that every world-version is only determined by a chosen language and the mind-independent world, and after all "THE [mind-independent] WORLD does not change in any way when we give descriptions of it." (Niiniluoto 1999, p. 219) . The identified facts belong to the same world as the unidentified ones. They are not an intermediate between us and the world. They are just the unidentified facts as described relative to some language.
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Nevertheless, I think this recourse is really an implicit admission that the world has an intrinsic structure, although it is one in which facts -events or "states of affair" that might happen according to such structure-are not yet identified through human categories or concepts, and when identified, it may occur in several alternative forms. If not, why are not all descriptions possible? In fact, Niiniluoto admits that the world has a very basic intrinsic spatio-temporal structure and obeys natural causal laws. This structure does not come from our languages and conceptual schemes.
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21 He is completely convinced that the problem can be solved: "Semantical realism is compatible with ontological pluralism: the non-epistemic correspondence theory of truth can be combined with the idea that objects can be individuated and identified in alternative ways through different conceptual systems," (Niiniluoto 1999, p. 205) . 22 Niiniluoto also distinguishes between unidentified objects and identified objects (literarilly unindentified flying objects (UFOs) and identified flying objects (IFOs)). Since UFOs form a part of THE WORLD, Niiniluoto finally admits that in some sense of the term 'object' (i. e., not self-identifying objects, "slices" of THE WORLD potentially identifiable in several ways) there are objects independent of our conceptual schemes (cf. Niiniluoto 1999, pp. 224-226) . 23 Cf. Ibidem. Niiniluoto also postulates a basic ontology consisting of mind-independent "property-individuals" located in space and time, such as the-brownness-of-this-table. These individualized qualities have been called 'tropes'. The property of being brown would be the class of similar tropes, and, as a class, is a human construction. The objects would be the mereological sum of jointly occurring tropes, which can be selected in different forms (cf.
Neither for Kitcher nor for Niiniluoto is the mind-independent world completely malleable by means of our conceptual frameworks. We cannot impose on the world any arbitrary structure and hope that this imposition will always work in practice. Niiniluoto calls 'factuality' the resistance the world offers to the attempts to fit it into any conceptual scheme. But, if the idea that the world has a previous structure is rejected, it remains to be seen whether it can be satisfactorily explained why the world accepts some classifications and resists others. Maps are more or less accurate, more or less true. A map of the London Underground would not be of use for guiding us through the Paris Underground. In fact, all possible maps of the London Underground have to keep some structural similitude if they are to be effective: not every structure of lines and stations, of crossing and changes, will be valid. Kitcher claims: "Users of different schemes of representation may find it difficult to coordinate their languages. Properly understood, however, the truths they enunciate are completely consistent." (Kitcher 2001a, p. 47) . Accepting that such is the case, what could guarantee this consistency except the fact that these languages refer to the same reality, a reality with an intrinsic structure that does not depends on them?
It is interesting to know that, according to some psychological experiments, a visual stimulus wholly devoid of structure cannot be perceived. The existence of structured stimuli is needed in order to have a visual perception. This order must come from a somewhat structured reality, not from our mind; otherwise the experimental results could not be explained. So, an unstructured and homogenous noumenal dough would be simply imperceptible. This is not incompatible with the well-known fact that our perception, being selective itself, processes inputs which sensorial stimuli provide. The point is just that the structure of the world responsible for structuring the sensorial stimuli is not necessarily the structure we finally attribute to the world. Our mind has an active role, a constructive role if we prefer the expression. It elaborates the brute material received through the senses in more or less complex forms. But this construction is not built on the noumenon, but on a world with some ontological structure of its own (cf. Boulter 2004).
I think some light can be thrown upon this issue if we distinguish three forms of understanding ontological realism, that is to say, three alternative ways of specifying how a mindindependent world is to be conceived. I will call them 'Platonic-Aristotelian Ontological Realism' (PAOR), 'Moderate Ontological Realism' (MOR), and 'Kantian Ontological Realism' (KOR). This is, respectively, what they affirm: Niiniluoto 1999, p. 30) . It is not clear to me how to conceive the 'tropes' except as a certain type of intrinsic structure of the world. The sort of ontological realism defended by Niiniluoto and its differences from Putnam's (and Quine's) position can be seen in the lucid and detailed discussion in Pihlström (1996), cap. 4.
(PAOR): The world has an ontologically complete and categorically fixed structure (it is a 'ready-made' and labeled world consisting of self-identifying objects). This structure dictates exactly one true and complete description of the world.
(MOR): The world has a basic intrinsic structure compatible with several (and, perhaps, potentially infinite) impositions and classifications made by our conceptual schemes or linguistic frameworks. So, it tolerates many different versions, but all of them within limits defined by this structure. It is an unfinished structure and also inexhaustible from the point of view of human interests and capacities. It is not categorically ready-made and it does not dictate just one correct description.
(KOR): The world possesses no intrinsic structure. Any structure in any worldrepresentation comes from our conceptual schemes, categories or languages.
(PAOR) is ingenuous, and hard to maintain given the pragmatists' criticisms (especially why it resists some of the things we might want to make with it by means of our languages and conceptual schemes. Finally, from an evolutionary point of view (KOR) is less plausible than its alternatives: if every world-structure comes only from our mind, it would be difficult to explain the adaptive value of our cognitive capabilities, since the world would have no role in the success of these abilities in managing the environment. Consequently, I hold that Kitcher's modest realism, like any other realism that refuses (PAOR), should accept (MOR).
(MOR) is not affected by many criticisms made against the dogmatism and the foundationalism of (PAOR), but it is still strong enough to explain why certain divisions and classifications fit into the world. We can offer only some world-versions, knowing that we cannot exhaust with them all the aspects of the world or to find the "Right Version." But, given the basic ontological structure of the world, not all versions are possible or equally suitable. There are versions that fit easily into such structure, whereas other versions need to be forced to fit into it, and finally other versions velis nolis do not fit at all. In the words of Umberto Eco, it happens to the world just "like to the ox or the calf: in different civilizations they are carved up in different forms, so that the name of some dishes is not easily translatable from a language into other.
However, it would be very difficult to conceive a carving-up that offers together the extremity of snout and the tail." (Eco 1997, p. 63) . The ox and the calf do not dictate what carving-up must be done; their ontological nature is "pre-butcherish," so to speak, and it tolerates different possibilities. Nevertheless, both have a structure that determines that no carving-up can include the snout and the tail in the same piece. 
Conclusions
Kitcher's modest realism, as displayed in Science, Truth and Democracy, is an attempt to integrate, from a moderate realist point of view, concerns about the democratic control of science.
In preceding decades, these concerns were often linked to antirealist and even openly relativistic positions. Kitcher holds the need for a well-ordered science, to wit, a science whose aims are set by the interests of democratic societies established by means of informed (scientifically tutored) processes of deliberation. Nevertheless, in line with his realism, Kitcher does not admit that social interests can affect the epistemic validity of scientific results. On this point, his approach is opposed to that of social constructivism. Democratic deliberation affects the research agenda -the sort of problems considered significant-, the resources to be assigned, the strategies seen as more However, from an ontological and semantic point of view, Kitcher's modest realism has some internal difficulties. It is not clear whether Kitcher accepts a moderate ontological realism, for which the world has a basic intrinsic structure compatible with several conceptual or linguistic impositions or divisions, or he accepts, instead, a Kantian ontological realism, for which the world lacks an intrinsic structure and any structure comes from our conceptual schemes, categories or languages. We have argued that it is possible to sustain a correspondence theory of truth -which is the theory of truth embraced by Kitcher-from the first kind of ontological realism, but not from the second. Therefore, modest realism makes sense only if it includes moderate ontological realism. 
